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SUMMARY 
 
The Need for Economic Stimulus/Job Creation 
Since late 2007, the nation has been plagued by a deep and long recession followed by a slow 
economic recovery. Arizona has been particularly hard hit, losing more than 300,000 jobs 
between fall 2007 and fall 2010. While job growth has returned since then, it has been modest, 
with employment still about 266,000 lower than it was at the prerecession peak. Many Arizonans 
have been unemployed or underemployed for an extensive period of time. The loss of income 
has caused many to lose their homes to foreclosure. 
 
The severe recession and mediocre recovery has led the federal government and many state 
governments to consider programs to stimulate the economy. The particular focus is on creating 
jobs: putting unemployed individuals to work until the economy strengthens and naturally 
provides enough jobs. 
 
While the public sector has various ways to influence the economy in the long term, few 
government actions can have much of an impact in the short term. The federal government has 
more tools than state governments to affect the economy in the short term since the Federal 
Reserve Bank has various means, such as controlling the money supply and setting interest rates 
that are not available to state governments. One of the primary tools available to the federal 
government to fight a recession or a weak recovery is to stimulate the economy through an 
increase in federal spending. This was part of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act. Additional federal stimulus spending currently is being debated in Congress. 
 
The 2009 stimulus act and the proposed act include several ways of stimulating the economy. A 
study by the Congressional Budget Office, which is consistent with the findings of econometric 
firms, indicates that direct spending by government for infrastructure is the most efficient means 
of stimulating the economy — these actions have the largest multipliers. Extending benefits to 
the unemployed and providing funding to state and local governments so that teachers and other 
personnel are not laid off have the next highest multipliers. The multipliers associated with tax 
cuts are smaller — tax cuts to corporations and higher-income individuals are highly inefficient 
ways of stimulating the economy. 
 
Thus, an increase in spending is the most efficient means available to a state government to 
stimulate the economy. It is the only means that can significantly boost employment in the short 
term. Public spending to repair existing, and to build new, physical infrastructure best meets 
these criteria. This public spending reaches the private sector quickly, has a strong multiplier 
effect, benefits the state in the long term, and can be implemented for a limited time without ill 
effects. Infrastructure spending has been used by several state governments as the major feature 
of their stimulus programs. 
 
The Need for Infrastructure 
Infrastructure needs in Arizona are considerable. Many infrastructure projects — for new 
infrastructure and for renovation of existing infrastructure — have already been approved and 
are “shovel ready,” only awaiting funding to proceed. Other projects could be started within a 
year. The inventory of projects is large since the state has lagged behind in the provision and 
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renovation of infrastructure for a number of years, with the recession reducing funding even 
further. Funding such projects would have a quick and substantial impact on job creation in 
Arizona. The state would merely be accelerating needed construction projects that will pay 
benefits both to individuals and the business community as soon as the construction is complete. 
 
Many of the identified infrastructure projects are for transportation, particularly highways and 
roads. Education needs also are considerable. The funding that has been provided for 
maintenance and repair of elementary and secondary schools falls substantially short of the needs 
and funding for maintenance and repair of higher education facilities also is needed. The 
construction of facilities to house additional prison beds and/or the renovation of existing prison 
facilities is another type of needed infrastructure. 
 
While an increase in infrastructure spending will most heavily impact the construction sector, 
this sector was the hardest hit during the recession. The effects of the spending, however, will be 
much broader. Some of the projects will need to be designed by engineers and architects. Mining 
and related rock product companies will benefit from an increase in demand for their products. 
An increase in the construction, mining, engineering and related workforces means that 
consumer spending will increase, benefitting a broad range of retail and service businesses. 
Wholesale trade and transportation will benefit from the rise in consumer demand and the 
increased demand for materials used in building the infrastructure. Thus, benefits will accrue 
across the economy. 
 
Apart from the jobs impact, this is an opportune time to undertake infrastructure projects. Interest 
rates are low, reducing the cost of borrowing. Construction materials are readily available, 
lowering their costs. Construction companies are desperate for work and will bid lower than they 
would at times when their resources are stretched thin. 
 
Paying for a Jobs/Infrastructure Program 
Because of balanced budget requirements and limitations on debt, any increase in state 
government spending will necessitate an immediate increase in state government revenues. If 
long-term financing is used (say for 10 or 20 years), then the size of the tax/fee increase does not 
need to be nearly as large relative to the amount needed for a “pay-as-you-go” program. While 
Arizona state government continues to be plagued by financial difficulties, it does not carry a 
heavy debt burden as does the federal government. In addition, tax burdens are low in Arizona, 
from both a historical perspective and in comparison to other states. Some Arizonans have the 
capability to pay substantially higher levels of state and local government taxes and fees than 
they currently are being asked to pay. Thus, Arizona is in a position where it could increase 
public spending. 
 
Though constitutional limitations on borrowing exist, long-term financing can be undertaken 
using revenue bonds that are tied to a revenue stream. Increases in taxes/fees would be put into 
effect, lasting until the debt was paid off. 
 
While public spending has a strong positive effect on the economy, the net positive effect is 
diminished by negative effects from an increase in public revenues. Thus, an important 
consideration is to limit the negative impacts on the Arizona economy of a revenue increase; an 
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increase in business taxes should not be considered. Another very important consideration is to 
not raise taxes or fees on those individuals who are struggling financially. 
 
Ideally, the additional revenue would come from affluent individuals who have the capability to 
pay additional taxes without reducing their spending. The most specific way of taxing affluent 
individuals is to raise the Arizona personal income tax rate on those reporting taxable incomes 
above a certain high level. Arizona’s personal income tax rates have been lowered repeatedly 
over the last two decades and are among the lowest in the country. 
 
Other possible means of raising revenues that target those able to pay include increasing the 
vehicle license tax on vehicles with a high dollar value and eliminating the homeowner’s rebate 
on property with a high assessed value. Another possible revenue source is to increase tourist 
taxes. Since tourists utilize Arizona’s transportation network and other physical infrastructure, it 
is reasonable to ask them to pay for a portion of the infrastructure costs. 
 
Economic Impacts of a Jobs/Infrastructure Program 
The primary economic benefits of investments in physical infrastructure accrue over decades as 
businesses and individuals use the infrastructure and as the existence of the infrastructure aids 
economic development. In addition to these benefits, short-term economic impacts result from 
the expenditure of funds to build/renovate the infrastructure. 
 
As suggested by the national multipliers, spending on infrastructure has a much larger economic 
impact than a tax cut of the same magnitude, according to two economic models specific to 
Arizona. In general, the positive effect of public spending is about double the effect of a 
reduction in personal taxes. 
 
The output from the economic models represents the net of several types of effects. While public 
funds are being expended, the large positive effects from spending on infrastructure are partially 
offset by the negative effects of a tax increase. If long-term financing is used, the negative effects 
of higher taxes last as long as loan payments are made. A small lasting positive effect from the 
construction of infrastructure is realized after the construction is completed. 
 
As long as funds are expended, the net impact from infrastructure spending is greater when long-
term financing is used than when a pay-as-you-go system is used. This is offset in subsequent 
years while the debt is being paid off. In the long term, the cumulative net effects of pay as you 
go and debt financing are similar. Since a primary objective of a stimulus program is to provide 
employment when most needed, the long-term financing option is preferable. 
 
If a $1 billion stimulus package that used 10-year financing were implemented over three years, 
with $300 million expended in the first year, followed by $400 million in the second year and 
$300 million in the third year, a conservative estimate of job creation would be about 7,300 in 
the first year, 9,600 in the second year, and 7,000 in the third year. If the package consisted of $3 
billion, the effects would be three times as large. 
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RECENT AND CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
The national economy follows a cycle in which a period of growth is followed by a period of 
decline (a recession). The Arizona economy is closely tied to the national economy. However, 
the Arizona economy is more volatile than the national economy, growing much more during 
economic expansions but sometimes declining more during recessions. 
 
The 2008-09 Recession and the Current Recovery 
The recent recession, dated as lasting from the beginning of 2008 through June 2009 (18 months) 
was the longest and deepest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Since the end of 
the recession, the pace of the economic recovery has been mediocre. 
 
United States 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the broadest indicator of national economic activity. The 
cumulative percent change in GDP by quarter during the first four years after the peak of an 
economic cycle is shown in Chart 1 for each cycle since World War II. The four-year period 
includes a recession and the first part of an expansion. Initially during the last recession, the 
decrease in GDP was similar to that of other cycles. However, at a time when many of the 
preceding cycles had begun to enter recovery, GDP continued to fall and at an accelerating rate, 
with the total decline reaching 5.1 percent after adjustment for inflation. 
 
 
CHART 1 
CUMULATIVE PERCENT CHANGE IN INFLATION AND SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN THE UNITED STATES 
OVER THE FIRST FOUR YEARS OF AN ECONOMIC CYCLE 
STARTING FROM THE PEAK OF THE PRIOR ECONOMIC CYCLE 
 
 
Note: The official dating of the national economic cycle is used. 
 
Source: Quarterly gross domestic product data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. 
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Since the official end of the recession, nearly all of the loss in GDP had been made up by the 
middle of 2011 (the 14th quarter since the prior cyclical peak). While the pace of the recovery 
was the slowest in the period since World War II, it was not much more sluggish than in the two 
preceding cycles. The main reason that the line for the current cycle in Chart 1 is so far below its 
predecessors in quarter 14 is the length and depth of the recession. 
 
Two components of GDP are responsible for the poor overall performance in the current cycle: 
personal consumption expenditures (which accounts for approximately 70 percent of GDP) and 
gross private domestic investment (which largely consists of investment in commercial and 
residential structures and investment in equipment and software). All types of consumption fell 
sharply during the recession; the weakness during the recovery particularly is in consumption of 
services. Similarly, all types of private domestic investment fell considerably during the 
recession but the weakness during the recovery has especially been in residential real estate, 
which has yet to begin to recover. 
 
Employment is a particularly narrow indicator of the economy since it is not measured in dollars. 
It does not consider differences in wages across jobs and no distinction is made between a part-
time and full-time job. Moreover, most measures of employment include only nonfarm wage and 
salary workers. Thus, the apparent economic health as measured by employment can be very 
different from the picture based on broader indicators such as GDP. Relative to the decline in the 
overall economy and to the relationship between employment and broader economic indicators 
in prior recessions, employment was affected disproportionately during the last recession and is 
experiencing a very slow recovery. 
 
Using the official dating of the recession for an analysis of employment can be misleading since 
the timing of the employment recession can be quite different from that of the overall economy. 
Nonfarm wage and salary employment (seasonally adjusted and excluding Census Bureau hiring 
of temporary workers for the 2010 census) fell in every month from February 2008 through 
February 2010 (25 months). Thus, decreases continued for eight months after the official end of 
the recession. A total of 8.75 million jobs (6.3 percent) were lost over these 25 months. Since the 
employment recovery began in March 2010, nearly 2.1 million jobs have been added (24 percent 
of the jobs lost). During the summer of 2007, however, the pace of the employment recovery 
slowed. 
 
Nationally, employment fell in nearly all sectors during the 2008-10 time frame — the 
exceptions are health care and private educational services. Declines from peak to trough were 
largest in construction and manufacturing, each of which began to decline well before early 
2008. While the percentage drop was not as great as in construction and manufacturing, job 
losses also continued for a long period in the information, finance and insurance, and real estate 
sectors. Employment has begun to recover in most sectors, but as of September 2011 gains had 
not yet returned in finance and insurance; arts, entertainment and recreation; and government. 
 
Arizona 
Arizona’s recession was longer and deeper than that of the nation. Since GDP by state is only 
calculated annually, the earnings component of personal income is the broadest available 
measure of the economy. Earnings began to decline in second quarter 2007 and continued to 
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drop through first quarter 2010. The total inflation-adjusted and seasonally adjusted decrease was 
9.5 percent in Arizona but only 6.4 percent nationally. The recovery also has lagged behind in 
Arizona, with the increase from the low point 3.0 percent in Arizona and 4.2 percent nationally. 
 
Employment (seasonally adjusted) dropped in every month from November 2007 through 
December 2009 in Arizona, then on net fell further through September 2010. Arizona lost 
324,000 jobs (12.1 percent) over this nearly three-year period. While job growth has returned 
since then, the recovery in Arizona has lagged behind the national average: only 18 percent of 
Arizona’s lost jobs have been recovered. As of September 2011, employment in Arizona still 
was about 266,000 lower than it was at the prerecession peak. 
 
Chart 2 is similar to Chart 1, except it presents employment in Arizona. The focus for Arizona is 
on the period since 1970. With the economy in Arizona still evolving and maturing through the 
1960s relative to the national economy, economic performance in Arizona prior to 1970 is not 
particularly relevant as a comparison to recent conditions. The recent employment recession in 
Arizona was much longer and deeper than in the preceding six cycles. Employment has barely 
begun to recover. 
 
Chart 3 indicates that the last employment recession in Arizona was longer and deeper than the 
national average and that Arizona has not yet begun to make up for the inferior performance.  
 
 
CHART 2 
CUMULATIVE PERCENT CHANGE IN SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ARIZONA 
EMPLOYMENT OVER THE FIRST FOUR YEARS OF AN ECONOMIC CYCLE 
STARTING FROM THE PEAK OF THE PRIOR ECONOMIC CYCLE 
 
 
Note: The dating is based on Arizona employment. 
 
Source: Monthly employment data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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This is in sharp contrast to the preceding cycle, which is representative of earlier cycles, in which 
employment fell much more modestly and for only a short period in Arizona relative to the U.S. 
average. During the expansion, Arizona’s growth quickly outpaced the national average. 
 
Like the nation, Arizona lost jobs during the recession in all sectors except health care and 
private educational services (see Table 1). The decline was especially deep in construction. 
 
The gains in health care and private education services during the recession were faster in 
Arizona than in the nation. In all of the other sectors, job losses in Arizona were deeper than the 
national average; in most sectors the period of decline was longer. One sector — construction — 
stands out as having experienced a much larger drop in Arizona than the national average (see 
Table 2). 
 
Relative to the nation, the pace of the employment recovery accelerated in Arizona during the 
late summer. After being behind the nation, the percentage increase in employment since the 
trough has passed the U.S. average. However, the performance has varied widely by sector, with 
the administrative support and natural resources sectors lagging far behind the nation. Though 
strong gains have been realized in recent months in construction, that sector’s employment 
remains far below the last peak relative to the U.S. average. 
 
 
CHART 3 
CUMULATIVE PERCENT CHANGE IN SEASONALLY ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT 
OVER THE FIRST FOUR YEARS OF AN ECONOMIC CYCLE 
STARTING FROM THE PEAK OF THE PRIOR ECONOMIC CYCLE 
 
 
Note: The official dating of the national economic cycle is used. 
 
Source: Monthly employment data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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TABLE 1 
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN ARIZONA BY SECTOR SINCE LAST PEAK, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 2011 
 
  
 
Peak 
 
 
Trough 
Length of 
Decline in 
Months 
Percentage 
Decrease from 
Peak to Trough 
Percentage 
Increase Since 
Trough 
Percentage 
Change Since 
Peak 
TOTAL Oct 2007 Sep 2010 35 -12.1% 2.4% -9.9% 
Natural Resources Sep 2008 Sep 2011 36 -25.9 0.0 -25.9 
Construction Jun 2006 Sep 2010 51 -56.0 7.6 -52.6 
Manufacturing Apr 2006 Sep 2010 53 -22.1 3.8 -19.2 
Wholesale Trade Feb 2008 Jan 2011 35 -12.5 2.5 -10.3 
Retail Trade Nov 2007 Sep 2010 34 -13.3 1.7 -11.9 
Transportation and Utilities Dec 2007 Jun 2010 30 -9.3 5.1 -4.7 
Information Jan 2006 Oct 2010 57 -21.6 2.2 -19.8 
Finance and Insurance Jan 2007 Sep 2010 44 -13.1 0.7 -12.5 
Real Estate and Rentals Dec 2006 Dec 2010 48 -19.0 4.7 -15.3 
Professional and Technical Services Feb 2008 Mar 2011 37 -12.4 1.9 -10.7 
Management of Companies Apr 2008 May 2010 25 -10.3 4.0 -6.8 
Administrative Support Mar 2007 Apr 2011 49 -24.7 1.9 -23.2 
Private Educational Services no cycle      
Health Care and Social Assistance no cycle      
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation Mar 2008 Apr 2009 13 -11.6 10.9 -1.9 
Accommodation and Food Services Dec 2007 Feb 2010 26 -9.0 5.3 -4.2 
Other Services Jan 2008 May 2011 40 -16.0 2.1 -14.2 
Government Aug 2008 Jul 2011 35 -7.4 3.3 -4.4 
 
Notes:  
Employment is seasonally adjusted and limited to nonfarm wage and salary workers. 
The dating of the peak and trough is based on the highest and lowest seasonally adjusted values in each sector in Arizona. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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TABLE 2 
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN ARIZONA RELATIVE TO THE NATIONAL AVERAGE 
BY SECTOR SINCE LAST PEAK, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 2011 
 
  
Length of 
Decline in 
Months 
Percentage 
Decrease 
from Peak to 
Trough 
 
Percentage 
Increase 
Since Trough 
 
Percentage 
Change Since 
Peak 
TOTAL 10 -5.8 0.8 -5.1 
Natural Resources 23 -10.2 -21.8 -28.6 
Construction 3 -26.9 6.3 -24.4 
Manufacturing -11 -2.0 1.3 -1.1 
Wholesale Trade 8 -2.6 0.7 -2.0 
Retail Trade 10 -5.4 0.0 -5.6 
Transportation and Utilities 8 -1.1 2.5 1.1 
Information -6 -7.2 0.9 -6.5 
Finance and Insurance -13 -4.7 0.7 -4.1 
Real Estate and Rentals -3 -7.4 4.0 -4.4 
Professional and Technical Services 14 -7.0 -1.9 -8.8 
Management of Companies 8 -7.1 1.9 -5.5 
Administrative Support 19 -8.2 -7.0 -14.1 
Private Educational Services no cycle    
Health Care and Social Assistance no cycle    
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation -29 -6.5 10.9 3.2 
Accommodation and Food Services 0 -4.6 2.4 -2.5 
Other Services 17 -12.0 -0.5 -12.6 
Government 6 -4.3 3.3 -1.3 
 
Notes:  
Employment is seasonally adjusted and limited to nonfarm wage and salary workers. 
The dating of the peak and trough is based on the highest and lowest seasonally adjusted values in each 
sector in Arizona and the United States. 
 
Interpretation: For example, for the total economy, employment in Arizona declined for 10 months longer 
than the national average and the decrease from peak to trough was 5.8 percentage points larger than 
the national average. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 
Causes of the Slow Recovery in Employment 
The real estate bust clearly contributed significantly to the severity of the recession. Since the 
real estate cycle was much more severe in Arizona than the national average, this helps explain 
why the Arizona economy has done so much worse than the national economy in recent years. 
With imbalances still remaining in real estate markets — large numbers of homes continue to fall 
into foreclosure and an unusually high number of vacant homes and commercial buildings 
preclude much new construction — the bust continues to be a drag on the economy more than 
two years after the official end of the recession. 
 
In part because of the real estate bust in Arizona, the percentage decline in retail sales (inflation 
adjusted) in Arizona was more than double that of the nation. Sales continued to decline in 
Arizona for more than a year after the national figure began to recover. The percentage increase 
since the low point has been barely more than half the national average. 
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Like the stock market boom from 1995 to 2000, the real estate boom of the mid-2000s disguised 
underlying issues by creating jobs that were not sustainable in the longer term. Despite the real 
estate boom, percentage job growth during the 2001-07 cycle was less than the historical norm. 
 
International competition coupled with relatively high wage levels in the United States are 
driving this shift of jobs to other countries. This is not a trend that can be reversed, at least not 
without a substantial decline in the American standard of living. The solution is for more 
Americans to enhance their educational attainment and technical skills so that the United States 
can reassert its leading global role in innovation — but this is a long-term solution. 
 
Some of the jobs that were lost during the recent recession probably will not return during the 
economic recovery. Instead, they already have been, or will be, replaced by jobs in other 
countries. While not a new phenomenon, permanent shifts in jobs from the United States to other 
countries continue. Combined with the large excess of vacant housing units and commercial 
space preventing the construction sector from leading the economic recovery as it has in the past, 
there is little to drive a recovery in employment — and little that the public sector can do to 
significantly change the dynamics in the short term. 
 
The Current Financial Status of Individuals 
During the mid-2000s, too many houses and commercial buildings were constructed, too many 
unwise real estate loans were made, too much borrowing was undertaken, and too much of the 
short-term profits from real estate appreciation were spent. Many Americans were left with no, 
or greatly reduced, tangible reserves (savings) once the real estate boom went bust. The boom-
bust cycle was much more severe in Arizona than in most of the country. 
 
The general recession worsened the situation: the value of investments in the stock market fell 
sharply, and many households were affected by job losses, reductions in wage rates, and 
cutbacks in hours worked. During the recession, both household and corporate debt rose more 
than in prior cycles and household net worth dropped far more than typical. Even with some 
recovery in stock prices and the beginnings of a recovery in the jobs market, a large segment of 
Americans continue to be in no position financially to contribute to an economic recovery — 
especially significant since personal consumption expenditures make up such a large proportion 
of GDP. 
 
While simplistic, it is useful to divide Americans (and Arizonans) into three rough groups: 
• Those who have been directly affected by the loss of a job, reduction in hours worked, 
reduction in wages, loss of home, etc. In response, people in this group greatly reduced 
their spending and still are in no position to increase spending significantly, even if given 
a tax cut or an extension/expansion in public aid. Instead, part of any additional income 
they receive is used to pay off existing debt. According to the October 2011 Rocky 
Mountain Poll, 52 percent of Arizonans have “cut back a lot” on their spending since the 
recession started. 
• Those who have not been affected by job losses or other loss of income, but whose 
savings have been substantially depleted due to the reduction in real estate values and 
stock prices. Moreover, during the recession, many of these individuals felt they were at 
risk of losing their job or of suffering a reduction in income; as a result, this group 
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reduced spending during the recession. While the end of the recession coupled with a 
rebound in stock market values during 2010 and early 2011 led to an increase in 
consumer spending, the slowing of economic growth since May 2011 and the stock 
market losses that have occurred since July have led to a reduction in confidence. Some 
members of this group still, or again, are concerned about job loss or other loss of 
income. As a whole, this group is likely to remain very cautious consumers for some 
months to come. According to the Rocky Mountain Poll, 21 percent of Arizonans have 
reduced their spending “some.” 
• Affluent individuals little affected by the economic conditions. Though their investments 
may have lost considerable value, people in this group still are financially comfortable. 
This group has spent all along and has no pent-up demand that will result in a boost in 
their spending. According to the Rocky Mountain Poll, 27 percent of Arizonans have not 
reduced their spending, or have done so “only a little.” 
 
The large baby-boom generation that is approaching retirement age (baby boomers currently are 
between 47 and 65 years of age) is of particular interest. While many baby boomers feel secure 
in their short-term income and retain some savings, many lost so much in home equity and other 
investments that they feel they must save considerably more than in the past in order to prepare 
for retirement. 
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PUBLIC-SECTOR ECONOMIC STIMULUS 
The public sector — even the federal government — has a limited ability to affect the course of 
the economy in the short term. Relative to state and local governments, the federal government is 
in the best position to fight recessions or otherwise stimulate the economy: 
• The federal government is in the best position to utilize a primary tool to stimulate the 
economy — increasing public-sector spending — since the federal government does not 
have constitutional restrictions related to the assumption of long-term debt and to 
balance its budget annually. Moreover, the federal government has more resources at its 
disposal, allowing it to put forth a sizable stimulus package that the 50 states working 
together would be unable to match. 
• The other tools to stimulate the economy are wielded by the Federal Reserve Bank and 
are not available to state and local governments. 
• A national solution to economic problems is most efficient since national economic 
conditions affect all states to some extent. 
 
Federal Government 
The federal government has been stimulating the economy throughout the recession and the 
succeeding weak recovery, through Federal Reserve Bank actions and the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). 
 
Federal Reserve Bank 
The Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) has aggressively used its powers, which fall into three 
categories: 
• Setting reserve requirements, which dictate the ease at which banks can make loans based 
on their existing reserve deposits. 
• Setting the discount rate, which is the rate charged by the Fed on its loans to banks. 
• Engaging in open-market purchases and sales of U.S. Department of the Treasury 
securities. Open-market transactions allow the Fed to essentially monetize Treasury debt 
during recessionary periods in an attempt to stimulate the economy. (Monetization is the 
conversion of securities into currency that can be used to purchase goods and services.) 
 
The Federal Reserve Bank’s actions to make credit lines available to prospective borrowers and 
those looking to finance business investment appears to have had limited success. While the Fed 
can make the cost of borrowing very cheap, it is the individual or business that has to take an 
action to actually use the credit. Expectations of adverse events, such as insufficient aggregate 
demand, make persons and corporations with liquid assets unwilling to invest, even if credit is 
available at a zero interest rate — a situation described as a “liquidity trap.” 
 
When the economy falls into a liquidity trap, the ability of the Federal Reserve Bank to stimulate 
the economy is limited. Monetary policy will increase demand at zero interest rates only if the 
Fed changes expectations about the future money supply or, equivalently, the path of future 
interest rates. During the recession, the Fed recognized the possibilities of a liquidity trap and 
pursued a policy of quantitative easing, an aggressive form of open-market operations where a 
wider array of financial assets are purchased directly from banks using newly printed money so 
as to insure that credit expands in the banking system. A second round of quantitative easing 
took place in fall 2010. 
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The Federal Reserve Bank continues to take action to improve the weak economy. In August 
2011, it announced it will keep short-term interest rates near zero through at least mid-2013. In 
September, it announced another round of quantitative easing in which it would purchase a large 
amount of Treasury securities maturing in six-to-30 years while selling an equivalent amount 
with maturities of three years or less in order to lower long-term interest rates. The Fed also 
stated that it would maintain its mortgage-related holdings at current levels to support the 
housing market. The Fed’s actions have been so aggressive that rising inflation is a concern in 
the longer term. 
 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
This federal stimulus package was passed by Congress in February 2009 in order to inject money 
into the economy in the short term that will be paid for in the long term. In essence, the funding 
was borrowed, raising the size of the federal deficit. Of the estimated eventual impact of $825 
billion, $719.1 billion had been spent as of September 30, 2011. While the bulk of the impact 
occurred during fiscal year 2010 (October 2009 through September 2010), the stimulus package 
still is having a positive effect today (see http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx). 
 
Two primary means of injecting money into the economy were used. First, tax reductions were 
implemented; 42 percent of the ARRA spending has gone to tax reductions, especially on payroll 
taxes. The goal of the tax reductions is for the recipients to spend that money; an increase in 
consumer spending could result in hiring increases across a broad segment of the economy. 
 
Second, direct spending by the federal government was increased, which raises demand at 
private-sector companies, resulting in additions to the workforce. The increase in direct spending 
took two forms. Of the $719 billion that has been spent as part of ARRA, 29 percent has been 
used for extensions to entitlements, particularly unemployment benefits and food stamps. 
Another 29 percent has taken the form of government contracts, grants, and loans. This funding 
has been used to repair and build physical infrastructure and to prevent further state and local 
government layoffs from occurring in the educational system. 
 
ARRA has been criticized as not working, but it is impossible that $719 billion of federal 
expenditures of the nature described did not have a positive effect on the economy. Without this 
injection of funds, the recession would have been even deeper and longer, and the recovery 
weaker, than has actually occurred. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) quantified these 
effects in its August 2011 report Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act on Employment and Economic Output from April 2011 through June 2011 
(http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/123xx/doc12385/08-24-ARRA.pdf). 
 
The CBO reports that 550,000 full-time-equivalent jobs were reported by recipients of ARRA 
funds, but that this measures the impact of only a portion of the ARRA spending. The CBO 
estimates the total effect of ARRA to be between 1.4 million and 4 million jobs nationally, 
including jobs saved that otherwise would have been lost as well as job creation. The 
unemployment rate is estimated to be 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points lower than what it would have 
been if ARRA spending had not occurred. 
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In order to evaluate the effects of ARRA, the CBO has estimated output multipliers, based on the 
direct and indirect effects of ARRA spending on GDP over a period of several quarters. 
Multipliers estimate the effects of the changes in the output of one or more industries on the 
output, employment, and labor earnings in the other industries. A multiplier of 1 indicates that $1 
of ARRA spending caused GDP to increase by $1. A multiplier of more than 1 indicates that the 
ARRA funding rippled through the economy, causing positive effects in industries other than 
that of the beneficiary. For example, in the case of infrastructure spending, some of the funding 
was used to hire an unemployed construction worker, who used some of his increase in income 
to purchase goods and services beyond what he had been buying while unemployed. A multiplier 
of less than 1 indicates that the beneficiary of ARRA funding did not spend all of the money 
received. For example, in the case of a tax cut to a wealthy individual, the money was saved 
instead of spent. 
 
In Table 3, the output multipliers estimated by the CBO are shown for each of the types of 
activity included in ARRA. Economy.com has estimated multipliers for various possible 
stimulative activities, some of which match the categories listed by the CBO. In each case, the 
Economy.com multipliers are in the middle half of the CBO’s range. 
 
The largest multipliers have come from direct expenditures by the federal government for goods 
and services and from transfers to state and local governments used for infrastructure. 
Conservatively, $1 of those types of spending resulted in an increase of $1 in GDP, but due to 
indirect effects, the total impact likely was more than $1 and perhaps as much as $2.50. 
Economy.com estimates the multiplier for infrastructure spending to be 1.59. The multiplier for 
transfers to state government for purposes other than infrastructure — largely to retain the jobs 
of teachers — is estimated to be somewhat lower: 0.7 to 1.8 according to the CBO and 1.36 
according to Economy.com. 
 
 
TABLE 3 
OUTPUT MULTIPLIERS OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY 
AND REINVESTMENT ACT 
 
 Estimated 
Multiplier 
 Low High 
Purchases of Goods and Services by the Federal Government 1.0 2.5 
Transfers to State and Local Governments for Infrastructure 1.0 2.5 
Transfers to Individuals 0.8 2.1 
Transfers to State and Local Governments for Purposes Other Than 
Infrastructure 
0.7 1.8 
Two-Year Tax Cuts for Lower- and Middle-Income People 0.6 1.5 
One-Time Payments to Retirees 0.3 1.0 
Extension of First-Time Homebuyer Credit 0.3 0.8 
One-Year Tax Cut for Higher-Income People 0.2 0.6 
Corporate Tax Provisions 0.0 0.4 
 
Source: The Congressional Budget Office. 
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Transfers to individuals, mostly in the form of enhanced benefits to those unemployed and those 
receiving food stamps, also has had a relatively high multiplier, estimated by the CBO as 
between 0.8 and 2.1. Economy.com reports multipliers for this type of spending are slightly 
higher than those for infrastructure: 1.73 for a temporary increase in food stamp payments and 
1.64 to extend unemployment insurance benefits. 
 
In contrast, the tax cut provisions of the stimulus act have had lower multipliers. In particular, 
the tax cut for higher-income individuals and the corporate tax provisions have multipliers of 
much less than 1. That means that for each dollar of tax reduction, less than $1 of spending 
occurred. Economy.com concurs, calculating the multiplier for corporate tax rate reductions to 
be only 0.3. Thus, tax reductions for corporations and high-income individuals are highly 
inefficient means of stimulating the economy. 
 
Other forms of tax cuts have higher multipliers, but not as high as for transfers directly to needy 
individuals, infrastructure spending, or transfers to state and local governments to save jobs for 
teachers. Economy.com reports the highest multipliers from changes in taxes to be 1.29 for a 
temporary reduction in the payroll tax, 1.26 for a refundable lump-sum tax rebate, 1.02 for a 
nonrefundable rebate (low-income individuals receive less than the full amount of the rebate), 
and 1.03 for a temporary across-the-board tax cut. In contrast, other changes to the tax code 
would have very low multipliers: 
• Extension of the alternative minimum tax patch: 0.48 
• Make the dividend and capital gains tax cuts permanent: 0.37 
• Make the Bush income tax cuts permanent: 0.29 
• Temporarily accelerate depreciation: 0.27 
 
On the whole, ARRA has not had as much impact on jobs as some expected or hoped, though 
those who argue that the “program did nothing” might examine the performance of the economy 
in 1930 and 1931 when the government made virtually no response to a massive adverse wealth 
shock. Still the results of the ARRA were disappointing. The primary reason for this is that the 
largest portion of the funding was for tax cuts for individuals, which have only a low-to-
moderate multiplier. In order to have a positive effect on employment, the money that otherwise 
would have been used to pay taxes must be used to increase consumer spending. 
 
None of the three groups of Americans discussed in the prior section have had much motivation 
to use the money realized by a reduction in taxes to increase spending. The group most directly 
affected by the recession likely used a significant portion of the money to pay existing bills and 
mortgages. Given the loss of income experienced by this group, the amount of their consumer 
debt, and the size of their mortgage payments, the reduction in taxes barely began to resolve the 
plight of this group. Instead of increasing their spending, the middle group, especially baby 
boomers approaching retirement age, likely saved a sizable share of the tax reductions in an 
effort to offset their significant losses in investments. The affluent group may not have increased 
their spending since they already were in a position to have bought what they liked. Thus, the tax 
reduction portion of the stimulus package, while a benefit to households in need, was an 
inefficient means of increasing the number of jobs. 
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Proposed Additional Stimulus 
In September 2011, President Obama proposed a second stimulus package, titled the American 
Jobs Act, which is similar in nature to the 2009 package. The proposed total funding is $447 
billion, a little more than half of the ARRA amount. The breakout of the proposed funding is 
shown in Table 4. With more than half of the funding allocated to tax cuts, the effect of this plan 
on jobs will fall short of a plan dominated by infrastructure spending and direct assistance to 
needy individuals. 
 
Whether this proposal will be enacted by Congress is a matter of conjecture. In addition to the 
typical political disagreements, the similarity of this package to the one passed in 2009 combined 
with the perception among some that the 2009 package did not work lessens the likelihood of 
passage. A further complication is the federal government’s already very large deficit. 
 
The tax reduction portion of the plan likely will again be only partially effective in restoring 
jobs. Consumer confidence currently is nearly as low as in 2009 when the original package was 
passed, debt levels remain high, and households continue to lose their homes to foreclosure. 
While the stock market rebounded considerably from mid-2009 to mid-2011, it has dropped 
since then. Under these conditions, it is likely that a significant portion of the tax reduction will 
again be used to pay existing debt or be put into savings rather than used to increase consumer 
spending. 
 
Though the payroll tax cuts in the proposal are extended to include employers, tax reductions to 
businesses will not increase demand for companies’ goods and services — the primary hindrance  
 
 
TABLE 4 
AMERICAN JOBS ACT 
 Cost in Billions of $ 
TOTAL  447 
   
TAX CUTS  245 
Businesses  70 
  Employer Payroll Tax 65  
  Extend 100 Percent Expensing 5  
Individuals: Employee Payroll Taxes  175 
   
INFRASTRUCTURE/JOB RETENTION  140 
Immediate Infrastructure (largely surface transportation)  50 
Modernize Schools  30 
Infrastructure Bank  10 
Rehabilitate Vacant Properties  15 
Nationwide Wireless Internet Services  0 
Retain/Expand Jobs for Teachers, Police, and Firefighters  35 
Veterans’ Hiring  na 
   
PATHWAYS TO WORK  62 
Unemployment Insurance Reform and Extension  49 
Tax Credit for Hiring Long-Term Unemployed  8 
Pathways Fund for Low-Income Youths and Adults  5 
 
Source: The White House (http://www.whitehouse.gov/jobsact). 
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to companies expanding their workforces. Many companies are highly profitable — corporate 
profits currently are nearly as high as the peak of the last economic cycle — but this has not 
translated into increased hiring. 
 
In contrast, the infrastructure/job retention portion of the proposal would again have a positive 
impact on employment. Much of the $140 billion in funding will be used to repair and build 
physical infrastructure, particularly surface transportation and schools. This spending directly 
results in the hiring of construction workers and ancillary positions. The increased spending of 
these individuals would ripple through the economy, affecting many industries. Similarly, the 
funding to keep teachers, firefighters and police from being laid off by state and local 
governments still experiencing budgetary difficulties and to hire additional workers in these 
occupations likely will result in a multiplier of more than 1. 
 
The White House has estimated the impacts of the proposed act in each state. The estimated 
effects in Arizona in the infrastructure/job retention category include 
• $602.7 million in immediate investments in transportation that is expected to create 
approximately 7,800 jobs. This calculates to one job per $77,300 expended. 
• $544.4 million to elementary and secondary schools for school infrastructure and $116.6 
million to community colleges, creating 7,100 jobs: one job per $76,700 expended. 
• $484.3 million for the rehabilitation of vacant homes and businesses. 
• $625.5 million for job retention and expansion for teachers, firefighters and police 
officers, resulting in 9,700 jobs, or one job per $64,500 expended. 
Funding on these programs in Arizona would total nearly $2.4 billion; an incomplete estimate of 
the effect on jobs is 25,000. In addition, the Pathways Fund could provide jobs to 10,000 (mostly 
youths) and the extension of unemployment benefits could assist 27,000 Arizonans. 
 
Infrastructure Bank. The President’s proposal includes the creation of an infrastructure bank to 
fund a portion of the infrastructure work. Despite being discussed in the past, a national 
infrastructure bank has not been created. (However, California has had an operating 
infrastructure bank for more than a decade.) The idea is to create a government agency to help 
arrange financing for infrastructure projects using funding from private investors. Through 
inexpensive loans and loan guarantees, the bank would attract investments from sources such as 
pension funds, hedge funds, and foreign nations. However, the need for seed money from the 
federal government is acknowledged as necessary. The bank would then lend the money to states 
and municipalities. 
 
In the context of a near-term stimulus package, a national infrastructure bank will not produce 
results. It is expected to take a minimum of one year, and more likely several years, to become 
operational. 
 
State and Local Governments 
A number of states have considered some form of an economic stimulus plan separate from the 
federal government actions and some have been implemented. The stimulus packages proposed 
or passed in other states have varied widely in content. Many have focused on tax credits, loans, 
and other actions to benefit businesses. In the current economic environment, businesses are not 
expanding and moving; enticements for them to do so will not be enough to overcome the 
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negative economic fundamentals. While these programs may be worthy from a long-term 
perspective, their benefits are not likely to be realized to a significant extent until the economy 
has already recovered. Even when the economy is stronger, actions to enhance economic 
competitiveness typically take years to realize substantial success. 
Tax reductions have been notably absent from the state plans. The public finance difficulties of 
recent years that have plagued every state to some extent no doubt have contributed to their 
absence. However, a strong consensus exists among economists that state and local government 
spending is much more effective than tax cuts in stimulating economic activity at a state or local 
level. Though one can find an article/study to support any position, the bulk of the literature 
supports the conclusion that state and local government taxes and incentives have little effect on 
economic activity or job creation. 
 
Some state plans have focused on the unemployed. Those programs that increase unemployment 
benefits have an immediate economic impact, but those featuring job training will have little if 
any impact in the short term. Since the recession began, the problem is not that employers cannot 
find qualified workers. Instead, the demand for goods and services is so low that companies have 
no need to hire additional workers. 
 
A number of states have considered, and some passed, stimulus programs that mostly or entirely 
consist of infrastructure spending. Such plans are in line with the economic literature — that 
such spending has an immediate impact on the economy and that the economic multiplier is 
relatively high for this type of spending. 
 
Most of the states considering or implementing an infrastructure program have estimated the 
effect of the program on jobs, including construction and other jobs directly paid for with 
stimulus funding and those jobs created indirectly through the multiplier effect. These estimates 
vary widely. Some states estimate that one job will be created per $25,000-to-$30,000 spent, 
which matches a nationwide estimate that transportation projects create one job per $26,600 
spent. In other states, the estimate is that as much as $80,000 must be spent to create one job. 
The estimates of the Obama Administration on the effect of spending in Arizona from the 
proposed stimulus package are at the upper end of this range. 
 
Of the states that already have implemented job creation programs, the “Jobs Now!” program in 
Illinois is the most aggressive. The program, which was passed by the legislature in mid-2009, is 
almost entirely focused on infrastructure, with two-thirds of the total funding allocated to 
transportation. Lesser amounts will be spent on physical infrastructure that supports education, 
community development, environmental, and economic development purposes. The state, which 
has twice as many residents as Arizona, will spend $13 billion of its own funds over six years. 
Combined with federal stimulus funds and federal and local government matching funds, the 
total package is $31 billion. Even with a conservative estimate of one job created per $70,600 
spent, 439,000 jobs would be created over the six years. The state portion of the funding is in the 
form of 20-year bonds supported by fee and tax increases. Various fees related to driver licenses 
and vehicle registrations account for one portion of the new revenue. Taxes on alcoholic 
beverages have increased and the sales tax has been extended to candy and selected other 
products. Another substantial source of new revenue is a tax on video gaming terminals. 
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Oregon’s Jobs and Transportation Act passed in 2009. It provides nearly $1 billion for 
transportation projects. An increase in fees for vehicle registration, titles, and license plates 
combined with an increase in the gas tax from 24 to 30 cents per gallon is estimated to raise 
about $300 million per year. The projected creation of 40,000 jobs seems overstated, as this 
amounts to one job per $24,000 of spending. Oregon also passed other legislation in 2009 that 
approved $175 million in bonds for construction and renovation projects, mostly at universities 
and community colleges. 
 
Several other states also have invested in infrastructure. Iowa is borrowing $830 million for 
flood repair and other infrastructure projects. North Carolina is spending $744 million on 
construction projects, mostly for education and corrections. Virginia has provided $230 million 
for university construction projects. In the small state of Vermont, $100 million in bonding is 
being used for transportation projects. 
 
Ohio’s $1.57 billion “Bipartisan Job Stimulus Plan” was passed in mid-2008. Funding comes 
from multiple sources, including the general fund, a tobacco fund, general obligation bonds, and 
revenues from state liquor stores and the Ohio Turnpike. It is a mixture of short- and longer-term 
programs that largely provide grants and loans to companies in selected export industries, but it 
also includes $400 million in infrastructure grants to local governments. Its estimated impact of 
57,000 jobs seems unlikely, as that translates to one job per $27,500, with the bulk of the funding 
going to purposes other than infrastructure for which any job benefits are speculative. 
 
A Possible Stimulus Package in Arizona 
The Arizona economy remains weak, with unemployment high and job growth slow. Conditions 
are not expected to improve much over the next couple of years. Thus, a stimulus package that 
delivers results in the near term would directly benefit many Arizonans and indirectly would 
boost the entire economy. 
 
In contrast, a stimulus package that slowly produces positive effects could on net be 
counterproductive. The Arizona economy is expected to recover in a few years, again creating 
jobs at a rapid pace. Stimulating an economy that already is operating at full capacity produces 
negative effects, increasing inflationary pressures, raising the rate of population growth at a time 
when the public sector is having difficulty keeping pace with increased demands, and increasing 
the costs of government. For example, the costs of public capital projects are higher when they 
are competing with numerous private-sector projects, due to the need for contractors to raise 
wage rates in order to attract a workforce and from cost increases resulting from material 
shortages. Thus, the focus of any stimulus package has to be to provide more jobs in the near 
term, with the effects tailing off with time. 
 
It also makes little sense to pursue inefficient options to boost the economy. Based on the CBO 
analysis discussed earlier, state and local government tax cuts, tax incentives, and similar actions 
have a limited impact on economic growth, and whatever impact such actions have take years to 
develop. Tax reductions and tax credits invariably reduce revenues available for public services, 
resulting in the need to decrease other government spending. The Arizona Legislature already 
has reduced taxes significantly. In a special session in early 2011, it passed legislation that 
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reduced a variety of business taxes, created tax credits, and formed a “deal-closing” fund. Thus, 
a potential stimulus program should entail other strategies than those already taken. 
 
Cost-effective options to state and local governments to create jobs in the local economy in the 
near term are highly limited. Increased spending is the only tool available to state and local 
governments to have a meaningful impact on the economy in the short term. Econometric 
models consistently indicate that increased government spending on infrastructure has a net 
positive economic impact, stronger than what is derived from a tax reduction of an equivalent 
magnitude (see the Economic Impacts section later in this report). Similarly, a decrease in public 
spending has a more adverse impact on the economy than an increase in taxes. 
 
The increase in public spending as part of a stimulus plan needs to be of a short-term duration 
that reaches the private sector quickly, has a strong multiplier effect, and benefits the state. As 
seen earlier, two types of spending meet these goals: spending for public infrastructure and 
enhanced benefits to those in need. In addition to meeting these goals, an infrastructure plan will 
direct assistance to the segment of the economy suffering the most — construction — and it will 
yield economic benefits that stem from putting needed infrastructure in place in a very cost-
effective manner. The next section of this paper looks at infrastructure in Arizona, showing that a 
substantial number of needed infrastructure projects have been approved, but lack funding. 
While some of these projects will build new physical infrastructure, many of the projects involve 
repair and renovation of existing structures. Options for funding a stimulus package are 
considered after the discussion of infrastructure. 
 
As part of a potential state stimulus package, the Arizona Legislature could take a simple action 
to enhance benefits to those in need without any cost to the state. Earlier in 2011, legislators 
chose not to extend unemployment insurance benefits, even though the source of funding was the 
federal government. Not only would this have assisted people truly in need, the multiplier from 
this type of spending is high, estimated by Economy.com at 1.64 — marginally higher than the 
multiplier for infrastructure spending. 
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INVESTING IN INFRASTRUCTURE IN ARIZONA 
To be economically competitive, an area’s physical infrastructure must meet the needs of 
employers. However, Arizona’s physical infrastructure generally is not perceived favorably. 
Capital spending in the state, especially for transportation, has consistently been lower relative to 
other states than would be expected of a state that generally ranks second in the nation in 
population growth. 
 
The availability of a quality infrastructure is consistently rated as one of the most important 
factors affecting economic development. For example, Site Selection Magazine’s 2009 
Corporate Real Estate Executive Survey — cited as a foundational basis for the 2011 special 
legislative session’s “jobs bill” — put the transportation infrastructure as the number one item on 
its list of top site selection factors. The utility infrastructure was ranked fourth. 
 
The Arizona Legislature in January 2011 addressed other factors on the Site Selection list that 
pertained to business taxes, incentives, and regulatory issues. Thus, legislation to improve 
Arizona’s infrastructure would round out the state’s economic development strategy. 
 
Much of the physical infrastructure, such as the transportation network, is provided wholly or 
largely by the public sector. With the limited public investment in infrastructure in the state and 
with the size of the budget difficulties facing state and local governments that will continue for 
some additional years, the state’s physical infrastructure is at risk of becoming a major negative 
factor on its economic competitiveness. The state’s existing infrastructure must be improved in 
order for the state to be economically competitive. Then, as growth of the Arizona population 
returns, additional infrastructure will need to be built. 
 
Infrastructure needs in the state were documented in the 2008 study “Infrastructure Needs and 
Funding Alternatives for Arizona: 2008-2032” that was produced by the W. P. Carey School of 
Business at Arizona State University. In general, over the next 25 years billions of dollars in 
currently unfunded infrastructure needs that will be the responsibility of state and local 
governments in Arizona were identified. The largest single need is for transportation projects; the 
deficiency over the next 25 years could exceed $100 billion. 
 
Some of the infrastructure needs will ultimately be funded by the private sector or by public-
private partnerships. The possibility of using public-private partnerships to build some types of 
infrastructure has received increasing attention over time. Various possibilities are being 
explored for transportation projects. However, because of the length of time needed to work out 
such partnerships, the short-term focus for a stimulus package needs to be on projects that state 
and/or local governments can initiate quickly on their own. A variety of public infrastructure 
projects fit these criteria. Transportation, particularly highways and roads, is a prime example as 
well as a major need. 
 
Though construction and related industries are the most affected by infrastructure spending, 
construction was the sector hardest hit during the recession. The effects, however, will be much 
broader. Some of the projects will need to be designed by engineers and architects. Mining 
companies will benefit from an increase in demand for their products. An increase in the 
construction, mining, engineering and related workforces means that consumer spending will 
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increase, benefitting a broad range of retail and service businesses. Wholesale trade and 
transportation will benefit from the increase in consumer demand and the increased demand for 
materials used in building the infrastructure. Thus, benefits will accrue across the economy. 
 
In the discussion that follows, various existing infrastructure needs are identified. Though 
certainly not a complete list, the cost of these state government projects sums to nearly $5 
billion. If local government needs are considered, the total is greater.) The need for these projects 
has already been established, but funding has not been provided. Many of the projects represent 
renovation needs that were identified years ago, but which have not been funded by the 
Legislature despite existing formulas meant to assure that such needs would be taken care of. 
Many of these projects could begin immediately, with others ready to start within a year. 
 
Higher Education 
A useful example of an infrastructure project is the Stimulus Plan for Economic and Educational 
Development (SPEED) that was approved by the Arizona Legislature in 2009. The program is 
primarily designed to fund the renovation and restoration of university buildings. As of 2009, the 
projects covered by this package had been delayed for years, with many buildings in desperate 
need of repair. In addition to creating jobs during a recession, the timing of the project was 
optimal due to lending costs near record lows and relatively low construction costs. In short, 
needed work could be done at a favorable cost, stimulating a slumping economy. 
 
The original request was for $1.4 billion; the Legislature approved $1 billion. Funding comes 
from the securitization of a portion of Arizona Lottery proceeds: a form of long-term borrowing. 
Estimates of the potential economic impact with spending of $1 billion included an increase in 
employment of 22,200 (one job per $45,000 spent — in the midrange of various estimates across 
states). 
 
Implementation of SPEED initially was delayed, then only $800 million was allocated. Less than 
$300 million has been issued (spent) to date. Thus, the economic impact of this program so far 
has been modest. Currently, there are plans to spend $171 million in the current fiscal year and 
an additional $50 million in fiscal year 2013. This leaves nearly $300 million of the $800 million 
in allocated funds unspent. 
 
Since the funding mechanism for SPEED is already in place, and since universities are not 
included in President Obama’s proposal to update and improve educational facilities, 
accelerating SPEED funding represents an excellent means of providing jobs to Arizonans. Since 
the needs exceed the currently allocated $800 million, the state could provide even more jobs by 
allocating the full $1 billion funding to this project. 
 
For example, Arizona State University has identified immediate needs for general building 
maintenance and repair, information technology infrastructure, renovation of labs and 
classrooms, installation and repair of sprinkler and alarm systems, etc. It estimates that projects 
totaling about $100 million could be implemented within 6-to-12 months, with an additional $50 
million ready in the 12-to-24 month time frame. It is reasonable to assume that similar needs 
exist at the University of Arizona, Northern Arizona University, and the community colleges. 
The total likely exceeds $300 million. 
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K-12 Education 
The School Facilities Board (SFB), a state agency, was created in response to a court decision 
that Arizona’s system of school capital finance was unconstitutional. The SFB provides partial 
funding for the construction of new public elementary and secondary schools across Arizona and 
for the renovation of existing buildings (“building renewal”). The remainder of the funding 
comes from school districts. 
 
The SFB received its first funding from the state government general fund in fiscal year 1999. 
Since then, annual funding has varied widely, with limited funding provided in years in which 
the general fund is in deficit. 
 
New construction of K-12 schools has slowed markedly in recent years. This is due in part to 
funding constraints resulting from the very large general fund deficits of recent years. However, 
growth in student populations has slowed significantly in response to the economic recession and 
the implementation of the employer sanctions law. Thus, a significant backlog in funding for 
new facilities does not seem to be present. 
 
In contrast, the current fiscal year (2012) is the fourth consecutive year that no funding has been 
appropriated by the Legislature for building renewal (maintenance and repair). These needs do 
not disappear during recessions and periods of slow growth in student enrollments. This lack of 
funding in recent years follows a decade in which appropriations for building renewal fell short 
of the amount indicated by the building renewal formula. This amount is annually calculated on a 
building-by-building basis, taking into account the building’s square footage, age, student 
capacity, and prior renovations. Cumulatively, the building renewal formula recommended 
funding of $2 billion from fiscal years 1999 through 2011. Slightly less than $650 million was 
appropriated, leaving a shortfall of $1.35 billion. The shortfall has exceeded $200 million in each 
of the last few years. 
 
A current professionally conducted needs assessment would not necessarily indicate that $1.35 
billion is required; no formula can be that accurate. Those familiar with the situation suggest that 
actual needs are not that great, though no other estimate exists. It is reasonable to assume that the 
needs amount to at least several hundred million dollars. 
 
Thus, a significant need is present to boost funding for school maintenance and repair. As with 
the higher educational system’s needs, these K-12 projects could start quickly, providing a short-
term economic stimulus. 
 
Transportation 
The Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) has a long-run transportation plan that 
extends to 2035. The needs statement expressed in the plan includes roads, highways, rail, and 
airports; maintenance and repair and new construction are included. The projected costs range 
from $89 billion to $250 billion (in 2009 dollars) over the 25-year planning horizon. The wide 
cost range reflects differing assumptions regarding future growth in the state. 
 
Despite these substantial needs, funding of only approximately $1 billion annually is expected to 
be available over the next 25 years, an amount in line with spending during each of the last 
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several years. The ADOT report clearly reveals the choice that Arizonans must make: either 
increase funding so that the state’s transportation infrastructure will adequately support the 
state’s population and businesses, or continue the current fiscally constrained path. The latter 
option will provide only modest support for maintenance of existing transportation 
infrastructure; few resources will be available to support the state’s expected growth. Moreover, 
no funding will be available to support a transportation-based economic development strategy. 
 
ADOT also has a detailed plan for transportation projects over the next 5 years. For highway 
projects, the plan calls for an expenditure of approximately $5.5 billion, with projects planned 
across the state. However, ADOT officials report that there is the need and nonfinancial capacity 
to build and repair transportation infrastructure at a rate that is at least twice as fast as the $1.1 
billion per year in the current plan. The constraint is fiscal — ADOT does not have the funding 
to pursue this higher work load. 
 
If funds were available, projects currently slated for 2013 and 2014 could be moved forward a 
year and plans for 2015-16 could be accelerated into the 2013-14 time frame. The five-year plan 
includes projects across the state that could be accelerated if funding were available. For 
example, work on the South Mountain freeway could be moved forward, helping to alleviate the 
congestion in the Ahwatukee area. 
 
These projects are “shovel ready,” only waiting for funding to proceed. Funding such projects 
could have a quick and substantial impact on job creation in Arizona. The state would merely be 
accelerating needed construction projects that will pay benefits both to individuals and the 
business community as soon as the construction is complete. 
 
Corrections 
The construction of new prisons and/or the expansion of existing prisons represent another 
physical infrastructure need. Though funding for the Arizona Department of Corrections has 
increased substantially over time, the number of prisoners has increased at a faster pace, due in 
part to Arizona’s mandatory sentencing laws. The current prison bed deficit is reported to be 
4,638. Assuming a construction cost of $50,000 per bed, the total cost to eliminate this deficit 
exceeds $225 million. A concern also has been expressed that existing facilities are in need of 
additional funding for repair and maintenance. 
 
Local Government 
In addition to the transportation needs identified by the Arizona Department of Transportation, 
most cities and towns have a backlog related to the construction, maintenance, and repair of 
streets. The backlog results in part from the Legislature transferring transportation funds 
intended for local governments into the state government’s general fund in order to balance the 
budget. Some cities and towns also report a backlog related to the construction, maintenance, and 
repair of their water systems. Though data are available for only a minority of the state’s cities 
and towns, the need for $100 million in transportation projects and another $100 million in water 
projects has been identified. If these needs are representative of all cities and towns, the state 
total would be about $1.5 billion in combined transportation and water system needs. County 
governments representing unincorporated areas are not included in this figure. 
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To provide a mechanism for financing local government infrastructure building, the idea of 
creating an infrastructure bank has been discussed. Some of the new revenue collected for an 
infrastructure program could be placed in an infrastructure bank. California has operated a state 
infrastructure bank for more than a decade that finances public infrastructure and private 
development that promotes economic development, revitalizes communities, and enhances 
quality of life for Californians. The bank has broad statutory powers to issue revenue bonds, 
make loans, and provide credit enhancements for a wide variety of infrastructure and economic 
development projects, and other government purposes. 
 
Establishing and funding an infrastructure bank in Arizona likely will take a few-to-several 
years. It will take time to set up the infrastructure bank due to legal issues, the need to create 
administrative and financial oversight, etc. Even with seed money provided by state government, 
it will take time to accumulate a significant amount of private funding. Once ready for operation, 
more time will elapse while local governments apply for funding and the bank evaluates the 
merit of the proposals. Thus, just as a national infrastructure bank will not create jobs in the near 
term, a state infrastructure bank should be considered based on its long-term merits, not as part 
of a short-term stimulus package. 
 
Discussion of Infrastructure Needs 
It is widely documented that the state of Arizona has massive infrastructure needs. Though the 
recent economic downturn has reduced consumption/use of public infrastructure and has greatly 
slowed Arizona’s population growth — temporarily alleviating the pressure for building new 
infrastructure — the needs remain. In addition, the downturn has exacerbated the state’s 
tendency to neglect maintenance and repair needs. Many policymakers have argued that there 
simply is no money available to support those needs. Yet, the state and local government tax 
burden is much lower than in the past, productivity/cost savings would be realized if these needs 
are addressed sooner rather than later, and spending on infrastructure would provide employment 
for thousands. 
 
Given that the current favorable financing costs and construction costs will not last, and that the 
needs for jobs is greatest now, an infrastructure program should be focused on taking on as many 
projects as quickly as possible. Since the Arizona economy is expected to recover and again 
achieve fast growth by around 2015, the infrastructure program should be limited to a length of 
around three years. Over these three years, documented state government needs on projects 
already planned and identified as needed run into the billions of dollars. If funding for 
transportation were doubled, this would amount to $3,300 million in additional funding over 
three years; capacity and needs likely exceed this amount. Additional spending could total $300 
million on higher education, $225 million on corrections, and as much as $1,350 million on K-12 
schools. Thus, upwards of $5 billion could be expended in the next three years — not including 
local government needs. 
 
Objections to public spending in order to “make work” for the unemployed are reasonable. In 
contrast, the need for each of the projects discussed above has already been demonstrated; in 
many cases plans are already in place — only funding is lacking. Thus, these are not arbitrary 
public works projects. 
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The Department of Transportation already has a process in place to oversee the selection of 
projects and to maintain oversight during the construction phase. The Board of Regents could 
provide oversight for the universities, the SFB is fully capable of assessing and prioritizing 
school construction and renovation, and the Department of Corrections is similarly situated to 
assess prison needs. If needed, independent private consultants and civil engineers could be 
retained to undertake needs assessments, helping to boost employment in the private sector. 
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FINANCING A STATE GOVERNMENT STIMULUS PACKAGE 
Any stimulus program will cost money. A means of paying for an increase in public spending 
must be found. 
 
Funding a stimulus program out of government surpluses might be viewed as an option: state 
government general fund revenues in the last fiscal year were higher than what had been 
budgeted and probably will be higher than budgeted again in the current fiscal year. However, 
the size of any surplus likely will be relatively small; for a stimulus package to have much of an 
effect in offsetting the many jobs lost in Arizona since 2007, the amount of funding needs to be 
substantial. Further, with a $1 billion loss in revenue coming in less than two years when the 
temporary sales tax rate increase ends, any surplus is likely to be short-lived — a budget deficit 
in fiscal year 2014 is more likely. Moreover, there are many competing uses for any surplus 
funds: rebuild the rainy-day fund, reverse transfers undertaken in recent years that sent monies 
from other state funds into the general fund, pay off some of the borrowing of recent years, and 
reverse some of the spending reductions passed in recent years. 
 
Thus, the state government can meaningfully stimulate the economy in the near term through an 
increase in public spending only by raising revenues. Tax burdens in Arizona are low, from both 
a historical perspective and in comparison to other states, making even a substantial increase in 
revenues feasible. While there is a cost to increasing public revenues, the net benefit still is 
substantial if the revenues are used for infrastructure spending. Economic impacts are presented 
in the following section. 
 
The costs arising from a tax or fee increase can be minimized by limiting, to the extent possible, 
tax hikes to those who are able to pay without reducing their spending. Some Arizonans have the 
capability to pay much higher levels of state and local government taxes and fees than they 
currently are being asked to pay. 
 
In a “pay-as-you-go” plan, revenues would need to be raised substantially, but only temporarily. 
Long-term borrowing — that is structured so as to not violate the constitutional prohibition — 
would require a much smaller increase in revenues, but the higher level would continue for a 
greater number of years. While state and local governments continue to be plagued by financial 
difficulties, they do not carry a heavy debt burden, making long-term borrowing feasible. 
 
Borrowing 
Some Arizonans are opposed to borrowing on the basis that it is unfair to burden future 
generations for expenses contracted today. Indeed, the use of debt financing to pay for current 
operations (for example, to balance the general fund) transfers the cost of programs from those 
who receive the services today to future Arizonans. However, this objection does not apply to the 
use of debt financing to pay for physical infrastructure that will benefit future generations. In 
fact, it is equitable and fair to transfer some of the costs of infrastructure to future Arizonans. 
 
Another objection to borrowing is the magnitude of the debt being amassed. Certainly this is a 
concern at the federal level. However, state and local governments have limits on the amount of 
debt that can be assumed. The amount of debt owed by Arizona governments currently is less 
than the limit. According to the Arizona Department of Revenue’s bonded indebtedness report, 
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government jurisdictions in Arizona have a total of $43.2 billion in outstanding debt obligations, 
less than the aggregate limit of $49.8 billion. 
 
The difficulty with borrowing is that state and local governments are restricted by the Arizona 
Constitution from traditional borrowing using full faith and credit obligations. Thus, borrowing 
that has been undertaken in recent years has been in one of two forms. Lease-purchase 
agreements and certificates of participation are legal tools that are the economic equivalent of 
general obligation bonds. An example is the sale/leaseback of state-owned buildings. The other 
option is debt tied to revenue streams (“revenue bonds”). An example is the securitization of 
lottery funds used for the SPEED project. In general, securitization is the process of taking an 
illiquid asset, or group of assets, and through financial engineering, transforming them into a 
security. 
 
Revenue Enhancement 
To get a sense of the ability of Arizonans to pay for a revenue enhancement to fund a stimulus 
program, revenues collected for the general fund are examined. Presumably, the general fund 
would not be used for either the revenues or expenditures for a stimulus package that consists of 
capital spending for infrastructure. 
 
Ongoing revenues to the state government general fund (which exclude certain types of 
revenues, for example the temporary sales tax rate increase) have been far lower in recent years 
than they were previously after adjusting for personal income, as seen in Chart 4. Dividing 
revenues and expenditures by personal income controls for inflation and population growth, and 
provides a measure of the aggregate ability to pay. The decline in revenues per $1,000 of 
personal income in the last few years occurred despite a drop in personal income during the 
recession. That is, Arizonans in aggregate paid less in taxes even after considering their ability to 
pay had dropped with their loss of income. 
 
Per $1,000 of personal income, ongoing general fund revenues were less than $32 in fiscal years 
2009, 2010, and 2011. Prior to fiscal year 2001, the figure was more than $45 in each year. Even 
after the economy recovers, revenues per $1,000 of personal income likely will remain below 
$40, reflecting the numerous and substantial tax cuts implemented over the last 20 years. 
 
Thus, a small but long-term increase in revenues that would be needed to fund an infrastructure 
package through debt financing would leave the tax burden in Arizona far below the historical 
norm. Even with a substantial increase in revenue that would be needed for a large pay-as-you-
go stimulus package, the burden would remain well below the historic norm. For example, had 
revenues in fiscal year 2011 been $1 billion higher than they actually were, revenues per $1,000 
of personal income would have increased only from $31.70 to $36.09. 
 
In determining the means of raising additional public revenues, an important consideration is to 
maximize the net positive effect of infrastructure spending by limiting the negative impacts on 
the Arizona economy of a revenue increase. In particular, an increase in business taxes should 
not be considered. Another very important consideration, especially given the length and depth 
of the recession and the weak recovery, is to not raise taxes on those individuals who are 
struggling financially. 
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CHART 4 
ONGOING REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES PER $1,000 OF PERSONAL INCOME, 
ARIZONA STATE GOVERNMENT GENERAL FUND 
 
 
Note: If an economic measure other than personal income were used to adjust revenues and 
expenditures, the pattern of the lines in the chart would essentially be the same. 
 
Source: Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee (revenues and expenditures) and U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (personal income). 
 
 
One possibility for raising revenue is to close tax loopholes, particularly in the sales tax. 
However, the amount of revenue to be gained is uncertain and the length of time that would be 
necessary to evaluate the tax code and to legislatively close the loopholes would preclude any 
stimulus package from having an effect when it is needed. Instead, taxes and/or fees will need to 
be increased quickly in order to fund a near-term stimulus program. 
 
Ideally, the additional revenue for a short-term stimulus package would come from affluent 
individuals who have the capability to pay additional taxes without reducing their consumer 
spending. Targeting this group would minimize the negative effects of a tax increase. For most 
affluent taxpayers, the additional tax payment would be in lieu of an increase in savings rather 
than a decrease in spending. Since most of the savings are placed in out-of-state financial 
instruments, the beneficial impact of increased government spending would hardly be offset by 
the negative effects from a tax increase. To the extent that spending by affluent taxpayers would 
be reduced, a relatively large share of the cutback likely would come from luxury spending made 
outside Arizona, such as out-of-state travel. 
 
The following discussion indicates that approximately $1 billion per year in additional revenues 
to pay for a stimulus package could easily be realized without raising tax rates past historical 
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norms and without increasing the tax burden of individuals struggling to make ends meet. For 
comparison, the temporary increase in the sales tax rate is raising close to $1 billion in a year. 
 
Personal Income Tax 
The most specific way of taxing affluent individuals is to raise the Arizona personal income tax 
rate on those reporting adjusted gross incomes above a certain high level. Individual income tax 
rates in Arizona are among the lowest in the country. The 2009 personal income tax burden of a 
household of three earning $150,000 in Arizona (as measured in Phoenix) ranked 41st among the 
50 states and District of Columbia, according to the Government of the District of Columbia, Tax 
Rates and Tax Burdens in the District of Columbia: A Nationwide Comparison 
http://cfo.dc.gov/cfo/cwp/view,a,1324,q,612643.asp. Arizona also ranked 41st on the overall tax 
burden of this affluent household. According to the Tax Foundation, State-Local Tax Burdens 
Fall in 2009 as Tax Revenues Shrink Faster than Income 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/22320.html, the overall tax burden of 
Arizonans in 2009 was 8.7 percent, 38th highest in the nation. Prior to the mid-1990s, the tax 
burden in some years was 10 percent, with Arizona ranking among the highest 20 states in the 
nation. 
 
In addition to being low relative to other states, current personal income tax rates in Arizona are 
lower than in the past. Arizona’s personal income tax rates have been lowered repeatedly over 
the last two decades, by a total of 35 percent. For those individuals with taxable income (after 
exemptions and deductions) of more than $150,000, the tax rate currently is 4.54 percent; it was 
7 percent during the early 1990s. Revenues would increase by approximately $800 million if tax 
rates were increased as follows: 
• From 4.24 to 5.42 percent for individuals reporting taxable income of between $100,000 
and $150,000, and for those married filing jointly and for heads of households reporting 
taxable income between $200,000 and $300,000. 
• From 4.54 to 7 percent for individuals reporting taxable income of more than $150,000, 
and for those married filing jointly and for heads of households reporting taxable income 
of more than $300,000. 
Taxpayers earning $200,000 or more currently contribute 32 percent of the total individual 
income taxes collected. With the specified rate increases, this share would rise to 42 percent, but 
would still be less than the 47 percent share paid in 2006. 
 
Property Tax 
Increasing the property tax collected on homes with a high assessed value is another way of 
collecting additional revenue from affluent Arizonans. Residential owners receive a 
“homeowner’s property tax rebate.” The rationale for this rebate originally was to assist low-
income homeowners, but the rebate was applied to all residential properties. The rebate is 40 
percent of the primary school district tax levy, up to a maximum of $600. Effectively, this is a 
subsidy given to residential property owners, paid for out of the general fund. The total cost was 
close to $400 billion in 2010. If the rebate were eliminated for homes assessed at more than 
some high value, such as $250,000, revenues likely would rise by tens of millions of dollars. 
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Transportation Taxes 
Since a significant portion of any stimulus funding likely would be used for transportation 
projects, raising revenues from the vehicle license tax and other transportation-related taxes and 
fees to help fund a stimulus package would provide a link between the source of revenue and the 
proposed spending. Vehicle license taxes in Arizona are currently substantially lower than in the 
past. Prior to 1999, the rate was $4 per $100 of assessed value; the current rate is $2.89. The 
current depreciation rate also is accelerated relative to the pre-1999 period. At the time of these 
reductions, the impact on revenues was estimated by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee to 
be $160 million. If the tax rate was returned to $4 per $100 of assessed value, the revenue 
increase would be considerably more than $160 million, given the growth of Arizona’s 
population and the inflation in car prices. However, such an across-the-board increase would 
negatively affect those individuals who currently are struggling financially. An option would be 
to limit any increase in the vehicle license tax rate to vehicles with a high dollar value, which 
might raise tens of millions of dollars. 
 
The fuel tax is another candidate for a rate increase since this tax has been assessed at a steady 
18 cents per gallon since 1990. Thus, revenue collections have not reflected inflation over the 
last two decades. While the potential exists to realize substantial additional revenues without 
putting the tax rate out of line with that of other states or Arizona’s past, any increase in rate 
would affect all automobile owners; it would not be possible to limit the rate increase to those 
able to pay. Similarly, fee increases could be imposed for driver licenses, vehicle registrations, 
and the like, but could not be limited to those able to pay. 
 
Tourist Taxes 
Direct expenditures in Arizona by visitors to the state were estimated at nearly $18 billion in 
2010. These visitors contributed around $550 million in various taxes, including some specific to 
tourists, or about 3 percent of their total expenditures. The tourism industry relies on a quality 
infrastructure, particularly for transportation — tourists heavily use roads and airports. Thus, it is 
reasonable to ask tourists to pay for a portion of the infrastructure costs. Additional revenues 
assessed on hospitality, airline, and local transportation services that totaled $100 million per 
year would amount to a 1.8 percent assessment on the $5.7 billion currently spent by tourists on 
those services. 
 
Discussion of Increasing Revenues 
Tax increases have never been particularly popular and the concept has arguably fallen even 
further from favor in recent years. Arizonans have been less averse to sales tax increases (indeed, 
an increase in the sales tax rate was passed by voters in 2000 to boost education funding and the 
2010 ballot measure for the temporary sales tax passed by a 64-36 margin). However, sales tax 
rates are already quite high in the state. Not only do lower-income people pay a higher share of 
their incomes in sales taxes, but the substantial sales tax paid by companies is a negative for 
economic development. If an infrastructure program were to be financed by sales taxes, it would 
be prudent to obtain the additional revenue from a broader sales tax base that includes personal 
services rather than from a rate increase. Moreover, a low-income tax credit should be 
implemented to mitigate regressivity. 
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The Arizona tax base has been dramatically reduced over time. Moreover, the revenue 
enhancements required to finance a short-term infrastructure program would be temporary, 
lasting only as long as needed to finance the projects. Concerns over the adverse impact of 
raising taxes during times when the economy is struggling can be mitigated by focusing the rate 
hikes on those able to pay without reducing their consumer expenditures and by financing the 
projects with long-term revenue bonds that match the benefits of the new infrastructure 
improvements with the costs of the projects. Long-term financing would sharply reduce the 
annual amount of tax/fee increase that would be required relative to a pay-as-you-go program. 
 
Similar concerns were voiced by opponents of the temporary sales tax initiative in the spring of 
2010 — that the higher taxes would have significant adverse impacts on the economy. There is 
no evidence that the one-cent temporary sales tax rate increase has had any adverse impacts. 
Moreover, as seen in the following section, a net benefit to the economy will result from an 
increase in revenues that are used to fund needed infrastructure projects. 
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ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A STIMULUS PACKAGE 
The primary economic benefits of investments in physical infrastructure accrue over decades as 
businesses and individuals use the infrastructure and as the existence of the infrastructure aids 
economic development. In addition to these benefits, short-term economic impacts result from 
the expenditure of funds to build/renovate the infrastructure. 
 
The economic impact of the infrastructure proposals can be obtained by application of economic 
models designed to measure the effects of particular initiatives on overall economic activity. 
Two economic forecasting/economic impact estimating models — Minnesota IMPLAN Group 
(IMPLAN) and Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) — have been used. IMPLAN is a static 
model designed to measure the economic impact of an initiative by measuring the direct impacts 
of the project and tracing the induced effects through the economy. IMPLAN implicitly assumes 
that all effects can be captured within a specific year. REMI is a dynamic model designed to 
measure how the growth trajectory of an economy is altered by a particular initiative, for 
example by changes in tax rates, price increases, or new capital investments. 
 
Conceptually, REMI is the superior application for measuring the impact of any infrastructure 
investment because investments in infrastructure — both new infrastructure and renovation of 
existing infrastructure — have impacts that last beyond a year. IMPLAN was used to compare its 
results to the REMI results in order to demonstrate that the results from REMI are not somehow 
aberrant from a realistic portrayal of the economic effects of infrastructure spending. 
 
The infrastructure spending is assumed to be comprised of a mix of investments on highways, 
new public buildings, and maintenance/repair of existing infrastructure. Changes in the mix of 
projects do not have much impact on the analysis. The spending initiatives are assumed to 
improve or enhance the public infrastructure of the state, adding to the stock of public capital and 
the public amenities, which in turn makes the state more attractive to in-migration and new 
businesses. In REMI, this creates a lasting positive effect even after the construction is 
completed. 
 
Funding of the infrastructure projects is assumed to come from personal taxes; the simulation 
results are not sensitive to the mix of personal taxes. However, results would be considerably 
different (much less favorable) if the source of funding was business taxes. 
 
Even if numerous “shovel-ready” projects exist, as indicated in the section on infrastructure, the 
length of time required to complete many of the infrastructure projects will exceed a year; that is, 
much of the money will not be expended until after the first year. Combined with the time 
required for any stimulus bill to work its way through the Legislature, the reality is that the 
majority of the spending will not occur until calendar year (CY) 2013 or later. Thus, while any 
stimulus package should try to spend the funding as quickly as possible, the reality is that some 
of the expenditures will not be made until two or more years after the passage of the stimulus 
package. For modeling purposes, it was assumed that 30 percent would be expended in calendar 
year 2012, 40 percent in CY 2013, and 30 percent in CY 2014. 
 
The models were used to provide insight into two analyses, as explained in the next two 
subsections. The economic impacts reported in these subsections include direct effects and 
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indirect (multiplier) effects. The results are expressed per $1 billion of stimulus funding, with 
$300 million expended in the first and third years and $400 million in the second year. The 
results from both models are scalable. For example, the impacts of spending $3 billion over three 
years would be triple those discussed below. At some point, however, increasing the amount of 
spending would realize diminishing returns. The assumed spending of $1 billion is less than half 
of 1 percent of the state’s gross product. If spending were, say, 20 times higher, it would 
represent a large enough share of the economy that it would start to crowd out private-sector 
spending. In addition, the higher tax burden would become a negative factor on economic 
development. 
 
Infrastructure Spending Versus Tax Reductions 
The purpose of this hypothetical analysis is to establish that increased public spending on 
infrastructure has a more stimulative impact than lowering taxes. First, spending for 
infrastructure was increased by $300 million in the first year, $400 million in the second year, 
and $300 million in the third year — without considering the means of financing the spending. 
While generally unrealistic, such a situation would occur if the federal government were to build 
infrastructure in the state without increasing federal tax obligations. 
 
Second, personal taxes were decreased by the same amounts — without considering how to 
resolve the budget deficit created by the reduction in revenues. This situation could occur if 
taxpayers received one-time rebates of taxes paid during a period of government surpluses. 
 
According to REMI, net positive economic effects accrue in both cases, but the net positive 
effects are approximately twice as large for a spending increase as for a tax reduction. For 
example, in the first year, 7,760 jobs would be created from a spending increase of $300 million 
while only 3,694 jobs would be gained from a tax reduction of the same size. The REMI effects 
are about one-third larger than those from IMPLAN, though IMPLAN also indicates that the 
positive impact of the infrastructure investment is larger than the positive impact of the personal 
tax cut by about a 2-to-1 order of magnitude. 
 
The positive impact from the spending increase is larger than the effect from a reduction in 
personal taxes because the money spent on infrastructure initially will largely stay in the Arizona 
economy, being used to hire workers and buy materials to build and repair the state’s 
infrastructure. In contrast, with a tax reduction, more of the money will immediately leave the 
state’s economy. Not everyone who receives a tax cut will spend the money in Arizona. Some of 
the money would go to paying off existing debt, most of which is held by a company 
headquartered outside Arizona. Some of the money would be saved, again with most of it 
invested in funds or deposited in savings accounts of institutions not based in Arizona. Some of 
the money would be spent, but not in Arizona (for example, on an out-of-state vacation). 
 
Of the money spent in Arizona, that coming in the form of a tax cut would escape the Arizona 
economy more quickly than the money initially spent on infrastructure. In other words, the 
multiplier is higher for infrastructure spending, as demonstrated earlier in this report. In the case 
of tax cuts, the first round of any spending will be for consumer purchases, with most of the 
goods not being produced in Arizona. The first round of the infrastructure spending will in part 
be in the form of wages to unemployed or underemployed Arizonans; another part will be in the 
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form of purchases of materials from Arizona companies. It is not until the second or later rounds 
of spending that leakages from consumer purchases occur. 
 
Pay-As-You-Go Versus Long-Term Debt Financing 
The second analysis looks specifically at infrastructure spending. Unlike the previous analysis, 
the infrastructure spending is financed by an increase in personal taxes. The economic impacts of 
two different financing plans are compared: (a) “pay as you go,” with funding coming from a 
temporary tax/fee increase; and (b) long-term debt financing based on an increase in taxes/fees. 
In order to raise the desired amount of stimulus funding, the long-term debt financing option 
would only require a relatively small increase in taxes/fees, but the higher rates would last for a 
longer period of time. 
 
In the pay-as-you-go option, the magnitude of tax/fee increases would need to be much larger. In 
the example of a spending schedule of $300 million the first year, followed by amounts of $400 
million and $300 million, revenues would need to be increased by these amounts. In contrast, if 
revenue bonds with a 10-year duration at a 4 percent rate of interest are used, the magnitude of 
the tax increase would only need to be around $120 million per year. If 20-year financing were 
used, the revenue increase would only need to be $72 million, but would last twice as long. An 
interest rate somewhat different from 4 percent would not impact the results substantially. 
 
The results that are displayed in Table 5 are the net of several types of effects. In the first three 
years, the large positive effects from infrastructure spending are partially offset by the negative 
effects of a tax increase. A small lasting positive effect from the infrastructure spending is 
realized in subsequent years. In the long-term financing alternative, as long as loan payments are 
made, this long-term positive effect is outweighed by the negative effect of the higher revenues 
required to make the payments. 
 
In the first three years, the economic effects are larger when using debt financing since the 
amount of revenue that needs to be raised is lower, reducing the negative effects from a revenue 
increase. Somewhat more jobs would be realized if the financing period is longer than the 10 
years assumed, though this additional positive effect disappears in later years. In the long term, 
the cumulative effects on employment from long-term financing are not much different than in 
the pay-as-you-go option. Since a primary objective of a stimulus program is to provide 
employment when most needed, the long-term financing option is preferable. The small losses 
that occur in subsequent years come at a time when the economy presumably will be expanding. 
 
A further disadvantage of the pay-as-you-go option is that in reality the funding would be slower 
to be realized than in the #1 alternative in Table 5. It is not realistic to assume that 30 percent of 
the total spending would occur in CY 2012. Revenues could not be spent until realized, unlike 
the long-term financing option, in which the full amount of funding would quickly be available. 
Thus, while the net effect on employment over the three years is similar in alternatives #1 and 
#2, hardly any positive effect could be expected in the first year in alternative #2 — in fact, the 
negative effects of a revenue increase could outweigh the positive effects of any spending. 
 
The results from the IMPLAN model are generally similar to those of the REMI model. Though 
IMPLAN shows a somewhat smaller net positive impact, it verifies that spending for 
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infrastructure will have a net positive effect on the Arizona economy and that the benefits in the 
first few years will be much larger if long-term financing is used. 
 
Though REMI produces larger effects than IMPLAN, the results for employment appear to be 
conservative compared to the effects estimated in other states for a stimulus program. In the first 
three years under the pay-as-you-go option, approximately one job would be created for every 
$70,000 spent. Using 10-year financing, the cost per job appears to be only around $42,000, but 
this does not take into account the net job losses that occur in subsequent years. 
 
 
TABLE 5 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF $1 BILLION IN INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING 
 
 Pay As You Go #1 * Pay As You Go #2 ** 10-Year Financing *** 
 Effect on Employment 
2012 4,066 -1,231 7,316 
2013 5,518 7,213 9,621 
2014 4,364 7,533 6,984 
2015 472 521 -440 
2016 460 478 -710 
2017 468 469 -845 
2018 471 465 -887 
2019 483 472 -881 
2020 484 471 -878 
2021 484 471 -869 
2022 483 469 -498 
2023 480 467 18 
2024 479 465 435 
2025 478 465 499 
 Effect on Gross Product in Millions of 2005 Dollars 
2012 215 -89 448 
2013 295 392 595 
2014 240 419 435 
2015 36 40 -34 
2016 35 37 -56 
2017 36 36 -69 
2018 37 37 -76 
2019 38 38 -77 
2020 39 38 -78 
2021 39 38 -79 
2022 39 38 -48 
2023 39 38 -3 
2024 39 38 3 
2025 40 39 4 
 
* Assumes spending and revenues of $300 million in 2012, $400 million in 2013, and $300 million in 
2014. 
** Assumes revenues of $100 million in 2012 and $450 million in each of the next two years; no spending 
occurs in 2012, with $500 million occurring in each of the next two years. 
*** Assumes spending of $300 million in 2012, $400 million in 2013, and $300 million in 2014, with 
financing costs of $36 million in 2012, $84 million in 2013, $120 million in each year from 2014 through 
2021, $84 million in 2022, and $36 million in 2023. 
 
Source: Modeled using REMI. 
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DISCUSSION 
Spending on infrastructure has been a significant feature of proposed and implemented stimulus 
programs of the federal government and of state governments. The logic is simple: needs exist, 
some projects are “shovel-ready” (only waiting for funding to start), construction and financing 
costs are at or near historical lows due to the considerable slack in the economy, and the 
spending will put unemployed Americans back to work. Spending now is akin to savvy investors 
taking action when assets are inexpensive so as to reap handsome returns in the long run. 
 
These are not “make work” projects to help the unemployed. Instead, these are important 
investment projects that once completed will benefit individuals and companies by meeting 
needs in transportation, education, and other public services. Spending for infrastructure sooner 
rather than later will provide a cost saving and enhance productivity once completed. 
Undertaking these projects now, while the economy remains weak, produces the added benefit of 
providing jobs to individuals at a time of high unemployment. While construction workers and 
related occupations will directly benefit from these projects, the indirect effects will spread 
throughout the economy. 
 
Some naysayers will argue that the state should not be undertaking these types of activities until 
the economy improves, that is until Arizonans can “afford” these projects. However, this 
argument ignores the immediate need to provide jobs, the existing needs for new and improved 
infrastructure, that investment in infrastructure can be growth enhancing, that capital costs and 
state and local government tax burdens are at historical lows, and that many economists believe 
the Federal Reserve Bank’s recent policies will ignite an inflationary spiral, pushing future costs 
up dramatically. So, a “wait-and-see” strategy will likely cost taxpayers far more than will an 
immediate action plan. 
 
Waiting also ignores the role that infrastructure plays in an economic development agenda. 
Substandard infrastructure is a substantial deterrent to economic development. Even before the 
recession began, Arizona had substantial infrastructure needs. Recent fiscal decisions and budget 
shortfalls have placed the state in a situation where the objectives of economic development 
initiatives may be hampered by the quality and quantity of the state’s infrastructure. 
 
State government infrastructure projects totaling around $5 billion have been identified — these 
projects are essentially ready for implementation and are needed now or in the very near future. 
Since no attempt was made to comprehensively identify all needed projects, total state 
government needs certainly are higher. Local governments also have substantial infrastructure 
needs that are essentially “shovel ready.” 
 
Approximately $1 billion per year in potential additional revenue has been identified, without 
raising tax rates higher than historical norms and without burdening those most affected by the 
adverse economic conditions. Again, no attempt was made to comprehensively identify all 
possible revenues, so the actual figure that could be raised within these parameters exceeds $1 
billion per year. To the extent possible, an attempt has been made to connect funding needs (e.g. 
transportation) with funding sources (e.g. tourist taxes, vehicle license tax, and other 
transportation-related fees). However, transportation needs far exceed the amount of revenue that 
could be raised from transportation-related taxes and fees, particularly without significantly 
 37 
raising the burden on those with a limited ability to pay. Thus, more generalized revenue sources, 
particularly the personal income tax, will need to be heavily used to provide funding for 
infrastructure. 
 
If the infrastructure spending were undertaken entirely under a “pay-as-you-go” system, then 
raising revenues by $1 billion per year for three years would allow $3 billion to be spent on 
infrastructure projects. Alternatively, the infrastructure projects could be partially or entirely 
funded through long-term financing. In this option, the short-term increase in revenues does not 
need to be as large as in a pay-as-you-go plan and the costs are spread out over time, better 
matching the long-term benefits provided by infrastructure. Moreover, as seen in the economic 
impacts section, long-term financing produces more jobs more quickly. If long-term financing is 
used, it is feasible to increase the total size of the infrastructure program beyond the $3 billion 
limitation of the pay-as-you-go alternative. 
 
Though public sentiment against debt financing seems to have grown, this largely is the result of 
the increasing federal debt that is being used to provide for current needs. The use of debt 
financing to pay for infrastructure projects that will be in place for decades or longer, thereby 
benefitting future generations, cannot be placed in the same category as debt used to finance 
current spending. It is sound fiscal policy to invest in infrastructure when it is needed and to 
maintain intergenerational equity in paying for this investment by financing the projects over a 
number of years. 
 
A useful analogy is that a family does not wait to purchase a house until they have saved enough 
to buy the house with cash. Instead, the family treats the purchase as an investment and expects 
to use the house for a number of years. Taking on a mortgage is seen as a wise action. In 
contrast, no one would recommend that a family should take on a long-term loan to buy goods 
and services that would be used up in the short term. 
 
In the previous section, the impacts of a stimulus package were presented per $1 billion of 
spending spread over three years. Based on 10-year debt financing, about 7,300 jobs would be 
created in the first year. A $3 billion program would create nearly 22,000 jobs in the first year; a 
$5 billion program would have an effect of more than 36,000 jobs. The latter figure amounts to 
14 percent of the 266,000 jobs that Arizona employment remains below the prerecession peak. 
Employment in the construction sector remains less than half of the peak level in 2006 — 
129,000 jobs lower. 
 
A $3 billion infrastructure investment over three years financed with 10-year revenue bonds 
would cumulatively generate more than 71,000 jobs over the next three years, with nearly 29,000 
coming in 2013. If the current number of unemployed were reduced by 29,000, the 
unemployment rate would be 8.2 percent instead of 9.1 percent. 
 
These projections of job creation are conservative since the economic models are not detailed 
enough to specify the explicit nature of the revenue increase. If, as discussed in the financing 
section, tax increases are carefully crafted to primarily affect affluent Arizonans who would not 
reduce their consumer expenditures, then the negative effects from a tax increase would be 
smaller than those modeled, causing the net effect on employment to be greater than modeled. 
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